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Throughout his career, Stephen Greenblatt (Will in the World, 388) tells us, 
William Shakespeare “was fascinated by exotic locations, archaic cultures, and 
larger-than-life-figures”. His usual practice is to place imaginative encounters 
with ethnic, religious, or political others in far-away locales. Shakespeare’s 
brothels are in Vienna, his Moors camped out on Cyprus, his Jews safely stowed 
away in Venice. But Shakespeare, like many of his contemporaries, also 
exoticized the past. Rome is often the ideal against which primitive Britain is 
measured, but Rome itself can be terra incognita. The crime at the heart of The 
Rape of Lucrece complicates further Shakespeare’s engagement with Roman 
otherness by inviting author, narrator, and readers opportunities for 
cross-gendered identification that aligns them at once with both victim and 
perpetrator in the rape that underwrites nation-building in this episode from 
Roman history. 
The Rape of Lucrece explores the violation and subsequent suicide of a 
virtuous matron who has suffered a brutal acquaintance rape at the hands of her 
husband’s friend and martial comrade, Tarquin. The poem not only records in 
detail the act of rape, but explores subsequently the victim’s physical and 
emotional trauma, her eloquent exploration of the moral dilemma in which she 
finds herself, and her public confession and death. After the crime is committed, 
the rapist slinks away like a dog and eventually is doomed by the Romans to 
“everlasting banishment” (l. 1855). The poem’s prefatory Argument informs us 
further that all of the Tarquins are banished and that the Roman monarchy is 
succeeded by a republican government, with kings being replaced by consuls.  
From the perspective of national history, innocent Lucrece has 
necessarily suffered—indeed, been sacrificed—for the good of Rome. Framed 
this way, The Rape of Lucrece sounds very much like a story of individual and 
community wrongs corrected by just retribution against the wrongdoer and a 
subsequent renewal of the state. As Heather Dubrow argues, however, Lucrece is 
governed by syneciosis, the trope by which logical and moral antitheses collapse 
continually into oxymoron. Dubrow (164) sees the conflict between the 
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providentially framed prose Argument and emotionally charged poem in light of 
the Renaissance debate between History and Poesy as methods for capturing 
events from the distant past, although she also recognizes that the overriding 
logic of syneciosis forestalls such neat binaries. To achieve a rapprochement 
with Shakespeare’s Lucrece as exotic other from an archaic past, we need to 
resist epic history’s teleological imperative and explore instead the poetic 
byways of thought and emotion the poem and its heroine offer up for our 
consideration. 
 
 
Revenge as Justice 
 
The Rape of Lucrece begins, in its prose Argument, with an emphasis on public 
injustice. The Argument passes quickly over the private crime lying behind this 
slice of history—the “cruel murder” of his father-in-law by Tarquin’s father 
Lucius—in favor of dwelling on the pater’s public crime: possessing himself of 
the Roman kingdom, in contradiction to “Roman laws and customs,” without the 
“people’s suffrage” or consent (Rape of Lucrece, Argument). Public justice is 
restored when Tarquin’s offense is “published” and the Romans, their suffrage 
restored, “give consent” to his “everlasting banishment” (ll. 1852, 1854-55). Yet 
once the poem proper has commenced, questions of public justice and the 
people’s rights recede into the background. “Lust-breathed” Tarquin (l. 3) 
considers almost exclusively the rape’s consequences for himself: at risk are his 
martial honor (“O shame to knighthood and to shining arms”); his family name 
and tomb (“O foul dishonor to my household’s grave”); his Roman piety 
(“O impious act including all foul arms”); and his more literally embodied 
manhood (the specter of “[a] martial man [made] soft fancy’s slave,” ll. 
197-203). Tellingly, the stanza ends with a glimpse of infamy’s physical toll, 
Tarquin’s vicious act legibly engraved “in my face,” the personal pronoun “my” 
erupting forcefully from his long list of abstract objects and institutions. 
Tarquin’s friendship with Collatine, furthermore, figures only belatedly into his 
deliberations (ll. 218-39, passim), and even then he moves quickly from 
acknowledgment that seducing Collatine’s wife would betray Tarquin’s 
friendship with him to musing about a counter-factual scenario in which 
seduction of Lucrece might be justified as revenge had Collatine murdered a 
Tarquin relative. The closest that Tarquin comes to considering actual others in 
his deliberations is when he imagines how his own descendants will “curse my 
bones” and “wish I their father had not been” (ll. 209-210). 
At the end of the poem, Lucrece adopts an equally self-referential 
perspective, calling on the Romans to revenge the crime against her. In a final 
anguished colloquy with herself before the Roman lords arrive to hear her 
message, Lucrece vows that she will not die until Collatine has heard her story, 
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“That he may vow, in that sad hour of mine, / Revenge on him that made me stop 
my breath” (ll. 1179-80; emphasis added). Between this point and her death, 
Lucrece utters the word “revenge” five times; once Brutus has removed the knife 
from her breast, appropriating to himself the visual and verbal signs of revenge, 
the word echoes an additional four times. In Lucrece’s iterated requests, revenge 
is allied syntactically with justice. She commands Collatine to be “suddenly 
revenged on my foe” because “sparing justice feeds iniquity” (ll. 1683, 1687; 
emphasis added). She asks the lords, as well, to plight to her their faith and 
“chase injustice with revengeful arms” (1. 1693). But all does not proceed as 
Lucrece proposes or even as Brutus promises, when he vows that “We will 
revenge the death of this true wife” (l. 1841); for in the end, a cooler justice wins 
out over hot revenge. In its final stanza, the poem matches the Argument’s 
pronouncement that “with one consent and general acclamation the Tarquins 
were all exiled” (Argument) with a direct verbal echo: “The Romans plausibly 
did give consent / To Tarquin’s everlasting banishment” (ll. 1853-55; emphasis 
added).  
 
 
The Borrowed Bed 
 
While The Rape of Lucrece unravels the symbolic coupling of justice with 
revenge, the poem also complicates its sense of public justice, mostly through 
Lucrece’s own evolving ethics. Even as she herself calls for revenge at the end 
of her poem, Lucrece’s language is shot through with evocations of alternative 
human relations. Resolving to die and posting her letter to Collatine, Lucrece 
determines that while Collatine himself should take revenge for her death, on her 
own recognizance she will “bequeath” to Tarquin her “stained blood,” which “by 
him tainted shall for him be spent / As is his due writ in my testament” (ll. 1181, 
1182-83; emphasis added). In harmony with the male ethics of property relations, 
Tarquin owes a debt to Lucrece (or more accurately, her husband) for the blood 
that he has tainted; this legal and binding debt or “due” imposed on Tarquin is 
written—fixed by ink—in the printed poem or “testament” that bears her name.  
Accompanying these paradoxical judicial metaphors are hints of a 
tangled economic calculus. Miriam Jacobson has analyzed the moral economics 
of rape in Lucrece through the figure of the cipher or “zero”—the null figure that, 
standing on its own, empties out meaning and substance, but self-multiplies by 
factors of ten when appended to another number. In the mathematics of the 
cipher, we see the particular economy of sexual transgression, for the empty “O” 
of female genitalia signifies not only woman’s sexual “lack,” but also the 
corporeal multiplication in pregnancy that naturally follows from sexual 
penetration of that null space. When Juliet marries Paris she will share in his 
body and possessions, “becoming yourself no less,” according to Lady Capulet; 
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but as the Nurse quips, Juliet will be “No less! nay, bigger; women grow by 
men” (Romeo and Juliet, 1:3:96, 97).1 In the passage that we have been 
examining, Lucrece’s blood will be “spent”—and in the word “spent” we can 
perceive a conflation of the idea of spending as sexual depletion with spending 
as a perverse payment of fee, both of which can be a zero-sum game ending in 
bankruptcy. The word “bankrupt” appears thirteen times in Shakespeare’s plays 
and poems, two of them in The Rape of Lucrece.2 The first occurrence comes 
when Tarquin is musing abstractly on the paradoxes of sexual covetousness:  
 
Those that much covet are with gain so fond 
That what they have not, that which they possess 
They scatter and unloose it from their bond; 
And so by gaining more they have but less, 
Or gaining more, the profit of excess 
  Is but surfeit, and such griefs sustain, 
  That they prove bankrout in this poor rich gain. (ll. 134-40; emphasis added) 
 
Lust’s satiety, the “expense” of sexual “spirit” in “a waste of shame” (Sonnet 
129, l. 1), is both the physical depletion of semen and a loss of moral and 
spiritual capital through the very achievement of that satisfaction. After the rape 
is complete, Tarquin dwindles into a “bankrout beggar” (l. 711) who steals away 
“like a thievish dog” (l. 734), doubly exiled from Rome’s systems of economic 
relations by these metaphorical identifications with beggar and thief.  
The judicial and economic mechanisms by which Lucrece reconfigures 
her relation to Tarquin recall Marcel Mauss’s classic study of the gift, in which 
systems of exchange, at once voluntary and constrained, bestow profit on and 
demand obligation from both parties. The spirit of generosity behind gift-giving 
is paradoxically fraught with rivalry and antagonism. We see this double-sided 
nature of economic and legal bonds in The Rape of Lucrece through her final 
testament, in which she “bequeathes” her tainted blood to Tarquin, the author of 
her harm, just as in the epilogue to Troilus and Cressida, Pandarus spitefully 
“bequeathes” his diseases to the audience (Troilus and Cressida, 5:11:24). As 
Mauss (63) notes, in Germanic languages the word “gift” also means poison, as 
the bequest of sexually tainted flesh and blood certainly does in Shakespeare.  
Lucrece’s final, poisonous “gift” to Tarquin has a pre-history in the 
debate between rapist and victim over their varied and mutual social 
responsibilities. Trapped by Tarquin in her own bed, Lucrece resorts to ethical 
arguments: 
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2 This is the count acquired through the search engine of the Shakespeare’s Words website: 
http://www.shakespeareswords.com/. 
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She conjures him [Tarquin] by high almighty Jove, 
By knighthood, gentry, and sweet friendship’s oath, 
By her untimely tears, her husband’s love, 
By holy human law, and common troth, 
By heaven and earth, and all the power of both, 
  That to his borrow’d bed he make retire, 
  And stoop to honour, not to foul desire. (ll. 568-74; emphasis added) 
 
Reminding Tarquin of his broader obligations to others, Lucrece raises all of the 
same arguments against the rape that he previously had posed to himself. “Sweet 
friendship’s oath” and “her husband’s love” enter more quickly into Lucrece’s 
dissuasion (ll. 569-70) than they do in Tarquin’s own deliberations, and she 
insists that he “melt at my tears and be compassionate” (l. 594; emphasis added), 
adding herself to the list of Tarquin’s moral debtors. The most material and 
troubling sign of Tarquin’s debt to both Lucrece and Collatine, however, is the 
“borrowed bed,” offered to him as a visitor to their home. Reciprocal obligations 
between host and guest provide a powerful deterrent to crime, as we see when 
Macbeth recognizes that as Duncan’s host he should bar the door against 
murderers, not wield the knife himself (Macbeth, 1:7:14-16). The word 
“borrowed” brings into play a different set of ethical imperatives that 
complement the more abstract demands of law and legal vows but also intensify 
the iniquity of Tarquin’s attempt to usurp the marital bed that belongs equally to 
Collatine and Lucrece. The bed, like the gift in Mauss’s analysis, is permeated 
with significance; as the bequest of Shakespeare’s second-best bed to Anne 
Hathaway might suggest, it is a particularly potent token of social obligation, not 
to be lent or borrowed lightly. 
In Shakespeare’s lexicon, the word “borrow” can have either a strictly 
economic meaning, as it does in The Comedy of Errors, when the Duke advises 
Egeon to “Beg thou or borrow to make up the sum” that would save him from 
death (Comedy of Errors, 1:1:154); or as it does when Shylock remarks to 
Antonio, “Methought you said you neither lend nor borrow / Upon advantage” 
(Merchant of Venice, 1:3:66-67). But in other instances, whether alone or in 
combination with the concept of “lending,” to borrow signifies some kind of 
human interaction: one person’s behavioral imitation of another, as when King 
John’s Bastard alludes to inferiors “[t]hat borrow their behaviors from the great” 
(King John, 5:1:51); a fanciful or metaphorical exchange of attributes or body 
parts, as when Mercutio teasingly advises the downcast Romeo, as a lover, to 
“borrow” Cupid’s wings (Romeo and Juliet, 1:4:17); a more complete 
impersonation, as when Kent, in disguise, seeks to “borrow” a less refined 
accent to fit his new rustic identity (King Lear, 1:4:1); and in a more brutal vein, 
one person’s usurpation of another’s status and physical place, as when the Duke 
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of Measure for Measure “borrow[s] place” of the disgraced Angelo (Measure for 
Measure, 5:1:359).3 
When Tarquin violates not just Lucrece’s bed but his own “borrowed” 
bed by exchanging it for hers, he disrupts the system of social exchange—the 
logic of the gift—on which Roman stability is built. Most obviously, this 
violation is figured as property theft, the proper victim of which becomes a 
matter of contention between Lucrece’s father Lucretius and her husband 
Collatine: 
 
The father says, “She’s mine”: “O mine she is,”  
Replies her husband, “do not take away 
My sorrow’s interest; let no mourner say 
  He weeps for her, for she was only mine,  
  And only must be wail’d by Collatine.” (ll. 1795-99) 
 
When Lucretius claims precedence because he gave Lucrece life—figured as an 
altruistic act of generosity—Collatine retorts that “she was my wife; / I ow’d 
[owned] her, and ‘tis mine she hath kill’d” (ll. 1803-1804). And the narrator 
confirms his version of the deed as a violation of property rights by describing 
Tarquin as slinking away from Lucrece’s bedchamber “like a thief.” 
Lucrece herself, by contrast, alludes to the economics of rape in the 
terms I have outlined above, as a violation of human relations by physical 
usurpation. Lucrece accuses Tarquin of having violated not only Collatine’s and 
her hospitality, as figured through the borrowed bed, but also of being “untrue” 
to himself by self-impersonation: “In Tarquin’s likeness I did entertain thee: / 
Hast thou put on this shape to do him shame?” (ll. 596-97). In effect, Tarquin has 
borrowed his own shape. Through this variation on Ovidian amatory 
metamorphosis, the rape collapses the boundaries separating Lucrece, Tarquin, 
and Collatine. While deliberating, Tarquin’s very mind is divided: 
 
Within his thought her heavenly image sits, 
And in the self-same seat sits Collatine. 
That eye which looks on her confounds his wits; 
That eye which him beholds, as more divine, 
Unto a view so false will not incline, 
  But with a pure appeal seeks to the heart, 
  Which once corrupted takes the worser part. (ll. 289-94) 
 
Both Lucrece and Collatine occupy Tarquin’s thought. By the logic of the 
metaphor, however, while Tarquin looks with two divided eyes (whose moods 
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Electronic Text Viewer (http://www.wordcruncher.com/). 
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and motives are very different), Collatine and Lucrece seem to vie for the same 
space (or “self-same seat”) in his head. Within the “seat”—either a dwelling 
place or a throne—of Tarquin’s thought, does Lucrece sit on her husband’s lap? 
Does one oust the other, as the Duke dismisses Angelo from his place of 
judgment or Petruchio dumps Kate from his lap? The bed of Lucrece becomes 
even more crowded than the seat of Tarquin’s thought when he bargains for her 
consent. Tarquin states that he intends to destroy Lucrece in her own bed (l. 514), 
even though in the next stanza he sweetens the deal by offering to remain her 
“secret friend” (l. 526). His negotiation includes the threat to place a fictional 
groom in Lucrece’s bed, the result being the scorn and shame that will follow her 
“surviving husband” (l. 519) and kinsmen, and the resultant bastardy of her 
descendants. While for Tarquin the curses of descendants were but a passing 
thought, we behold here the tragic loading of Lucrece’s bed—burdened with not 
only Lucrece, Collatine, and Tarquin, but the hypothetical groom, Lucrece’s 
kinsmen, and a never-ending procession of her bastardized descendants. 4 
Lucrece’s honor is now at the mercy of an inexorable mathematics of 
multiplication. The borrowed bed, the sign and agent of a hospitable exchange 
among Lucrece, Collatine, and Tarquin, has by its violation piled woe upon woe. 
 
 
Recognizing Lucrece, or What’s Hecuba to Her? 
 
The collapse of boundaries separating the agents in a gift economy is, as Mauss 
noted, a potential danger of the system itself. This collapse might also be called 
one possible manifestation of political “misrecognition.” In “Learning to Curse,” 
Stephen Greenblatt analyzes Caliban’s poetry and curses in light of colonialism’s 
double-edged narrative. In one strategy, the colonizer represents the colonized as 
speaking gibberish; in the second, the Other is represented as speaking flawless 
English. According to the first narrative, the native’s linguistic inferiority 
justifies colonization because the colonized are less than human; according to 
the second narrative, the native’s linguistic facility justifies colonization by 
absorption, since there is no linguistic distinction between colonizer and 
colonized. In both cases, the colonized are manipulated through the binary of 
identity and difference. The alternative that can disrupt this binary is what 
ethicist Charles Taylor has identified as the “politics of recognition.” 
In his essay of that name, Taylor (25) begins: “A number of strands in 
contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition” 
(emphasis in original); “and the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways 
                                                        
4 We are told that after the rape, Lucrece “bears the load of lust he left behind” and Tarquin “the 
burden of a guilty mind” (ll. 734-35), but I think that here the narrator’s perspective is overly 
narrow, too caught up in the horror of the moment to see the event’s full ramifications. It will 
remain for Lucrece herself to work out these implications. 
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in today’s politics, on behalf of minority or ‘subaltern’ groups, in some forms of 
feminism, and in what is today called the politics of ‘multiculturalism’”. The 
“demand for recognition,” Taylor (25) continues, derives from “the supposed 
links between recognition and identity,” identity being in part 
 
shaped by recognition and its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, 
and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can 
inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, 
distorted, and reduced mode of being. (emphasis in original) 
 
For Taylor, in this frequently quoted passage, the politics of recognition is a 
necessary counterbalance to the tendency of nationalism to operate through the 
dialectic, identified earlier by Greenblatt, between the invitation to sameness 
(“be one of us”) and a reification of difference (insiders can be identified in 
relation to designated, inferior “outsiders”). The Rape of Lucrece dramatizes this 
dialectic between sameness and difference within the emerging nationalism of 
Republican Rome. But more important and surprising, Shakespeare’s poem also 
offers us a brief glimpse of a possible politics of recognition, located primarily 
in Lucrece’s exploration of her physical and moral condition after the rape. 
The “recognition”—whether personal or political, rational or 
emotional—that Lucrece receives from her father, husband, and the other Roman 
men is limited and incomplete. They echo dutifully Lucrece’s assertion of her 
own innocence—“Immaculate and spotless is my mind,” she declares (1. 
1656)—confirming through unanimous assent that “her body’s stain her mind 
untainted clears” (1. 1710). But Lucrece herself is finally reduced to a thing, a 
“bleeding body” (l. 1851) that the men will parade throughout Rome. In effect, 
the Romans complete the indignity inflicted on Lucrece by Tarquin during the 
rape, when he had effectively rendered his victim both silent and invisible. In 
order to be capable of carrying out his rape, Tarquin had to stop his ears against 
Lucrece’s pleas and to avoid the very sight of her face and body. With his foot, 
Tarquin extinguishes the torch that illuminates Lucrece’s bedchamber: “For light 
and lust are deadly enemies,” as the narrator informs us. He also stifles 
Lucrece’s cries, and her powerful arguments, by pulling her night clothes over 
her face in a gesture that is grotesque, almost comic: 
 
The wolf hath seized his prey, the poor lamb cries; 
  Till with her own white fleece her voice controll’d 
  Entombs her outcry in her lips’ sweet fold: 
 
For with the nightly linen that she wears 
He pens her piteous clamours in her head; 
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Cooling his hot face in the chastest tears 
That ever modest eyes with sorrow shed. (ll. 677-83) 
 
This image of Lucrece entombed in her own linen foreshadows the corpse that is 
paraded through Rome’s streets at the end of the poem. By silencing Lucrece 
and effacing her person, the Romans have ironically replicated, perhaps even 
surpassed, Tarquin’s effort to eradicate the object of his lust as a person who 
must be seen and heard—that is, to be recognized. 
But it could have been otherwise, for The Rape of Lucrece gives us a 
glimpse of what the politics of recognition might look like. Lucrece, abandoned 
like a “castaway” after the rape, performs an extended complaint in which she 
apostrophizes a series of abstract entities—Time, Night, and Opportunity—in 
search of a culprit to blame for her situation. Lucrece’s complaint, however, is 
punctuated by an intermittent desire for female companionship that might 
provide her with alternatives to solitary weeping and revenge. Imagining Tarquin, 
allegorized as Night, defiling Cynthia and her handmaids, Lucrece identifies 
them as potential conversationalists who could provide her with “fellowship in 
woe” (l. 791). Later, Lucrece calls on Philomel “to make thy sad grove in my 
dishevelled hair,” so that these two birds of a kind might exchange mournful 
ditties about the parallel crimes of Tarquin and Tereus (ll. 1133-34). Interestingly, 
at this crux in her meditation, Lucrece can imagine fellowship only in terms of a 
collapse of physical boundaries, realized through the visually confounding 
conceit of Philomel, presumably after her metamorphosis into a bird, nestling 
into Lucrece’s hair. The two will also collaborate on a mournful song in which 
Lucrece, “burden-wise,” will “hum on Tarquin still” while Philomel “on Tereus 
descants better skill” (ll. 1133-34). Implicit in the musical programme that 
Lucrece sets for herself and Philomel, by contrast with the visual conceit of the 
bird in Lucrece’s hair, is the separation of singers and musical lines that 
produces harmony. 
In reaching out to Philomel, if only in a poetic sense, Lucrece also 
acknowledges the intellectual and emotional power of examples, a theme that is 
worked out at greater length when Lucrece remembers the “skillful painting of 
Priam’s Troy.” This is where Lucrece begins to move from pathetic complaint 
into another rhetorical key. “Reading” sequentially through the painting’s 
depiction of the fall of Troy, Lucrece encounters numerous figures and objects 
who pass through her field of vision as visual fragments: weeping tears, the 
gleaming eyes of dying people, wives lamenting their husbands, laboring 
pioneers in the thick of battle—“Begrimed with sweat, and smeared all with 
dust”—pale cowards, quaking peasants, and much more. This part of the poem 
derives not from Ovid, of course, but from Books 1 and 2 of Virgil’s Aeneid, 
where Aeneas has a similar artistic encounter at the house of Dido. But while 
Aeneas beheld the tableau from a fixed subject position—himself—Lucrece, as 
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Robert Miola (35) points out, identifies with a range of others. She settles, 
finally, on one particularly congenial figure, “despairing Hecuba” (l. 1447), 
depicted in the painting as standing stock-still and “staring on Priam’s wounds 
with her old eyes, / Which bleeding under Pyrrhus’ proud foot lies”:  
 
On this sad shadow Lucrece spends her eyes, 
And shapes her sorrow to the beldame’s woes, 
Who nothing wants to answer her but cries, 
And bitter words to ban her cruel foes.  
The painter was no god to lend her those, 
 And therefore Lucrece swears he did her wrong, 
 To give her so much grief, and not a tongue. (ll. 1457-63) 
 
The dynamics of exchange here are particularly interesting. Lucrece, in a sisterly 
transformation of the sexual economics established by the rape, “spends” 
copious tears in sympathy with Hecuba, whose sorrows in turn seek an equally 
spontaneous and unfettered “answer.”5 Aware that the painter did wrong to 
Hecuba by giving her so much grief without a “tongue” to express it, at first 
Lucrece offers to avenge the Trojan queen’s grief directly with physical 
retribution, as the lords vow to revenge her injury: “Show me the strumpet that 
began this stir / That with my nails her beauty I may tear” (ll. 1471-72). In a 
broader sense, however, Lucrece becomes Troy’s elegist, expressing as well as 
feeling sorrow for the destruction of the city and its historical players: 
 
Here feelingly she weeps Troy’s painted woes; 
For sorrow, like a heavy ringing bell, 
Once set on ringing with his own weight goes; 
Then little strength rings out the dolefull knell. 
So Lucrece, set a-work, sad tales doth tell 
 To penciled pensiveness, and coloured sorrow; 
 She lends them words, and she their looks doth borrow.  (ll. 1492-98;  
emphasis added) 
 
Despite the mechanical metaphor with which the stanza begins—Lucrece’s 
weeping as a tolling bell that keeps ringing of its own momentum, a mournful 
echo without meaningful words—Mary Jo Kietzman (38) sees this exchange as a 
“dialogic interaction”; the figure of “Hecuba” is created cooperatively by the 
“painter who supplies her image” and by Lucrece the viewer, “who animates the 
image with her own subjectivity and experience”. There is no real economic 
                                                        
5 In a recent essay, Samuel Arkin analyzes the dynamics of sympathy through the figure of “deep 
impressions” into marble. Ultimately, however, he thinks of sympathy as a seductive fantasy of 
human relations beyond social institutions; he sees the Romans’ “consent” as less ironic than I 
do, and he does not consider the role of language, or “lending words,” to these interactions. 
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force behind the word “spend” as Lucrece “spends her eyes” on the sad shadow 
of Hecuba: she simply devotes all of her attention to Hecuba, depleting without 
calculation her own visual resources. Nor can we hear in the musical exchange 
between these older and younger tragic women any sense of a mercenary 
transaction: from the penciled figures in the Troy painting, Lucrece “borrows” 
looks and, in turn, “lends” to these figures her own words. Theirs is an emotional 
economy, beyond the institutions of law, debt, justice, sex, and power but still 
regulated by an ethical relation. 
This is a watershed moment for Lucrece and Lucrece. Critics have noted 
how, in the poem, moral ethos manifests itself on the body through the language 
of heraldry. Lucrece’s modesty is figured in her face as a “silent war of lilies and 
roses” (l. 71). 6  Tarquin imagines his own shame emblazoned through a 
“loathesome dash” in his coat of arms (ll. 206, 207). After the rape, however, 
Lucrece becomes both unreadable and incapable of social discourse. The maid 
who greets Lucrece sees “sorrow’s livery” in her mistress’s face (l. 1222), but 
dares not ask the reason. The problem of illegible faces proliferates as the groom 
who bears her letter to Collatine blushes from “bashful innocence” rather than, 
as Lucrece thinks, from “knowledge of her shame” (l. 1341). Their encounter 
culminates in mutual misrecognition, both parties blushing furiously as they 
misunderstand one another. Within the Troy painting, the narrator suggests, the 
“art of physiognomy” is more reliable. The painter offers a strong Character of 
Ajax, his eyes rolling with “rage and rigour,” and of Ulysses, who with a “mild 
glance” signaling his self-control, wear their hearts in their faces (ll. 1398, 
1399-1400). But the art of perspective itself confounds simple characterology, 
for his spear is all that can be seen of Achilles (l.1421-28), the rest of the figure 
being hidden behind a press of people, and all we see of the war-weary Trojans 
are their eyes as they peep through the towers’ loopholes. Portraiture by 
synecdoche comes to signify social fragmentation for Greeks and Trojans alike. 
Worse, the Troy story offers in “perjur’d Sinon” an exemplar whose deceitful 
words and “humble gait” are both deceptive. Like Tarquin, he hides an evil mind 
within a “fair” form (ll. 1521, 1530), and Lucrece responds by tearing the 
painting or cloth with her nails. The encounter with Hecuba, by comparison, 
maintains the equity of exchange necessary to recognition, lending words and 
borrowing looks without breaching the artistic illusion or, metaphorically, the 
bodily boundary separating her from Hecuba. Telling “sad tales” of Troy’s fall, 
Lucrece recognizes Hecuba—physically, emotionally, morally, and ethically—in 
the way Charles Taylor imagines, and is poised to achieve some kind of social 
resolution, or reconciliation.  
 
                                                        
6 The “moral heraldry” employed by the narrator of The Rape of Lucrece, as well as the rhetorical 
function of the Troy painting generally in the poem, are discussed by Hulse, Dubrow, and Arkin, 
among others. 
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Lucrece’s Eloquent Corpse 
 
While I concur with those critics who sense a restoration of patriarchy, property, 
and male political domination at the conclusion of The Rape of Lucrece, there 
remains one final opportunity for ethical and political recognition based on the 
feminine model established by Lucrece and Hecuba: the emblem constructed 
through visual and verbal dialogue between Lucrece’s body and the narrator’s 
text. Once Brutus has removed the knife from Lucrece’s breast, her “bubbling” 
blood 
 
   doth divide 
In two slow rivers, that the crimson blood 
Circles her body in on every side, 
Who like a late-sack’d island vastly stood 
Bare and unpeopled in this fearful flood. 
 Some of her blood still pure and red remain’d, 
 And some look’d black, and that false Tarquin stain’d. (ll. 1737-43) 
 
Emblems, as “speaking pictures,” are generally constructed as an inert image 
explicated by a printed text; this, however, is an emblem in vivo. In her 
exploration of humoral theory in the animal realm, Gail Kern Paster notes that 
black blood is indicative of melancholy. While Paster analyzes the melancholy 
cat as her example, The Rape of Lucrece reaches further down the chain of being, 
proferring the corpse as a sentient being and moral agent that embodies 
its  mistress’s melancholy. (We might remember a similar agency and 
expressiveness in the behavior of Henry VI’s corpse at the commencement of 
Richard III.) Lucrece’s emblematic body, with the blood divided into two 
streams by the knife that took her life, not only represents her existential 
condition—as a “wracked,” “unpeopled” island—but also expresses Lucrece’s 
self-assessment that she is both innocent and tainted.  
In effect, the interaction between eloquent corpse and witnessing 
narrator reproduces and extends the cycle of borrowing and lending initiated by 
Lucrece and Hecuba. Hecuba, like the body of Lucrece, initially appears as a 
grotesque: 
 
In her the painter had anatomiz’d 
Time’s ruin, beauty’s wrack, and grim care’s reign; 
Her cheeks with chops and wrinkles were disguis’d: 
Of what she was no semblance did remain. 
Her blue blood chang’d to black in every vein, 
 Wanting the spring that those shrunk pipes had fed, 
 Show’d life imprison’d in a body dead. (ll. 1450-56) 
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With a sight this shocking and degraded, possibilities for political 
misrecognition abound, yet the stanza offers hope of renewal amid death and 
destruction. This emblem of Hecuba as a ruin, her blue blood changed to black, 
is in rhetorical dialogue with the speaking picture of Lucrece’s corpse, with its 
heraldic rivers of red and black blood. Together, the painter, narrator, and 
Lucrece give new life to the walking anatomy that once was Hecuba. The cycle 
begins again as the narrator and corpse act in concert to emblematize Lucrece as 
moral agent. Perhaps, if Samuel Arkin is correct, the circle of borrowing and 
lending will widen even further to induce sympathy in the Roman people who 
behold that corpse and who must give their consent for justice to be enacted 
against the Tarquins. 
 
 
Postscript: Hamlet’s Hecuba  
 
When Hecuba is invoked again in the Player’s speech from Hamlet, she and her 
milieu are a discarded relic from the historical and literary past. Hecuba watches 
the desecration of her husband Priam’s body in agonized silence. According to 
the Player’s familiar text, 
 
But if the gods themselves did see her then 
When she saw Pyrrhus make malicious sport 
In mincing with his sword her husband’s limbs, 
The instant burst of clamour that she made – 
Unless things mortal move them not at all – 
Would have made milch the burning eyes of heaven, 
And passion in the gods.’ (Hamlet, 2:2:492-98; emphasis added) 
 
The substance of this speech clearly harkens back in its diction to the ekphrasis 
from Lucrece. But in the later iteration, Hecuba’s complaint is never enunciated 
and her pleas go unheeded. Borrowing looks and lending words has lost its 
power to cultivate recognition through rhetoric. What is left, as Hamlet and 
Hamlet discover, is only revenge. We have come full circle. 
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